Calvin's Institutes

Section: 1.18.3-4

3. God’s will is a unity

While hitherto I have recounted only those things which are openly and unambiguously related in Scripture, let those who do not hesitate to brand the heavenly oracles with sinister marks of ignominy see what kind of censure they use. For if they seek from pretending ignorance to be praised for moderation, what haughtier thing can be imagined than to oppose God’s authority with one little word such as “To me it seems otherwise,” or, “I do not want to touch upon this”? But if they openly curse, what will they gain by spitting at the sky? Indeed, an example of such petulance is not new, for in every age there have been impious and profane men, who have frothed and snarled against this portion of doctrine. But they shall surely feel to be true what the Spirit declared of old through David’s mouth, that God may overcome when he is judged [Ps. 50:6, Vg.; 51:4, EV]. David indirectly reproves the madness of men in the very unbridled license with which, out of their own filthiness, they not only argue against God, but claim for themselves the power to condemn him. Meanwhile, he briefly warns that the blasphemies they spew out against heaven do not reach God, but that he, dispelling their clouds of calumnies, makes his own righteousness shine forth. Even our faith (because, founded upon God’s Sacred Word, it is above the whole world [cf. I John 5:4]) from its lofty height despises these clouds.

For it is easy to dispose of their first objection, that if nothing happens apart from God’s will, there are in him two contrary wills, because by his secret plan he decrees what he has openly forbidden by his law. Yet before I answer, I should like my readers again to be warned that this cavil is not hurled against me but against the Holy Spirit, who surely put this confession in the mouth of the holy man Job, “As it pleased God, so was it done” [Job 1:21, cf. Vg.]. When he had been robbed by thieves, in their unjust acts and evil-doing toward him he recognized God’s just scourge. What does Scripture say elsewhere? Eli’s sons did not obey their father because God willed to slay them [I Sam. 2:25]. Another prophet also proclaims that “God, who resides in heaven, does whatever he pleases” [Ps. 115:3]. And now I have already shown plainly enough that God is called the Author of all the things that these faultfinders would have happen only by his indolent permission. He declares that he creates light and darkness, that he forms good and bad [Isa. 45:7 p.]; that nothing evil happens that he himself has not done [Amos 3:6]. Let them tell me, I pray, whether he exercises his judgments willingly or unwillingly. Yet, as Moses teaches, he who is killed by a chance slip of the ax has been divinely given over to the striker’s hand. [Deut. 19:5; cf. Ex. 21:13.]

Thus, according to Luke, the whole church says that Herod and Pilate conspired to do what God’s hand and plan had decreed. [Acts 4:28.] And indeed, unless Christ had been crucified according to God’s will, whence would we have redemption? Yet God’s will is not therefore at war with itself, nor does it change, nor does it pretend not to will what he wills. But even though his will is one and simple in him, it appears manifold to us because, on account of our mental incapacity, we do not grasp how in divers ways it wills and does not will something to take place. When Paul said that the calling of the Gentiles was “a mystery hidden” [Eph. 3:9], he added shortly thereafter that in it was shown forth “God’s manifold wisdom” [Eph. 3:10]. Because God’s wisdom appears manifold (or “multiform” as the old translator renders it), ought we therefore, on account of the sluggishness of our understanding, to dream that there is any variation in God himself, as if he either may change his plan or disagree with himself? Rather, when we do not grasp how God wills to take place what he forbids to be done, let us recall our mental incapacity, and at the same time consider that the light in which God dwells is not without reason called unapproachable [I Tim. 6: 16], because it is overspread with darkness. Therefore all godly and modest folk readily agree with this saying of Augustine: “Sometimes with a good will a man wills something which God does not will… . For example, a good son wills that his father live, whom God wills to die. Again, it can happen that the same man wills with a bad will what God wills with a good will. For example, a bad son wills that his father die; God also wills this. That is, the former wills what God does not will; but the latter wills what God also wills. And yet the filial piety of the former, even though he wills something other than God wills, is more consonant with God’s good will than the impiety of the latter, who wills the same thing as God does. There is a great difference between what is fitting for man to will and what is fitting for God, and to what end the will of each is directed, so that it be either approved or disapproved. For through the bad wills of evil men God fulfills what he righteously wills.” A little before he had said that by their defection the apostate angels and all the wicked, from their point of view, had done what God did not will, but from the point of view of God’s omnipotence they could in no way have done this, because while they act against God’s will, his will is done upon them. Whence he exclaims: “Great are God’s works, sought out in all his wills” [Ps. 111:2; cf. Ps. 110:2, Vg.]; so that in a wonderful and ineffable manner nothing is done without God’s will, not even that which is against his will. For it would not be done if he did not permit it; yet he does not unwillingly permit it, but willingly; nor would he, being good, allow evil to be done, unless being also almighty he could make good even out of evil.”

4. Even when God uses the deeds of the godless for his purposes, he does not suffer reproach

In this way, also, the other objection is solved, or rather vanishes by itself: if God not only uses the work of the ungodly, but also governs their plans and intentions, he is the author of all wickednesses; and therefore men are undeservedly damned if they carry out what God has decreed because they obey his will. His will is wrongly confused with his precept: innumerable examples clearly show how utterly different these two are. For even though, when Absalom committed adultery with his father’s wives [II Sam. 16:22], God willed to punish David’s adultery with this shameful act, yet he did not for this reason bid the wicked son commit incest, unless perhaps with regard to David, as he speaks concerning Shimei’s railings. For when he confesses that Shimei curses him at God’s command [II Sam. 16:10-11], he does not at all commend his obedience, as if that impudent dog were obeying God’s authority. But recognizing his tongue to be a scourge of God, he patiently bears the chastisement. We ought, indeed, to hold fast by this: while God accomplishes through the wicked what he has decreed by his secret judgment, they are not excusable, as if they had obeyed his precept which out of their own lust they deliberately break.

Now the choice of King Jeroboam [I Kings 12:20] shows clearly that what men do perversely is of God, and ruled by his hidden providence. In this choice the rashness and insanity of the people is condemned for having perverted the order sanctioned by God, and having faithlessly fallen away from the house of David. And yet we know that he willed him to be anointed. Accordingly in Hosea’s statements there likewise occurs a certain appearance of contradiction: for God complained in one place that that kingdom had been established without his knowledge and against his will [Hos. 8:4]; yet elsewhere he proclaims that in his anger he had given King Jeroboam [Hos. 13:11]. How will these statements agree: that Jeroboam did not reign by God’s will and yet was appointed king by the same God? The answer is obviously that the people could neither revolt from the house of David without shaking off the divinely imposed yoke, nor was God himself deprived of the freedom to punish Solomon thus for his ungratefulness. Therefore we see how God does not will a breach of faith, yet with another end in view, justly wills defection. Hence likewise, contrary to expectation, he compelled Jeroboam with sacred anointing to become king. In this way the Sacred History says that an enemy was raised up by God [I Kings 11:23] to divest Solomon’s son of part of his kingdom.

Let my readers weigh both these things with care. Because it had pleased God that his people be governed under the hand of one king, when the nation is split into two parts, it is done against his will. And yet the beginning of the separation came from the will of the same God. For surely when the prophet both by word of mouth and by the token of anointing stirred Jeroboam, who was thinking of no such thing, to the expectation of the kingdom, this was not done without the knowledge or against the will of God, who so commanded it to be done. And yet the rebellion of the people is rightly condemned because against God’s will they revolted from David’s descendants. For this reason, also, it is afterward added that Rehoboam haughtily despised the petitions of the people and that this was done by God to establish the Word which he had proclaimed through the hand of Ahijah his servant [I Kings 12:15]. Note how it is against God’s will that the sacred unity is broken, and yet how by his same will the ten tribes are estranged from Solomon’s son. Besides this, there is another similar example, where with the people’s consent-indeed, with them lending a hand-the sons of King Ahab are murdered, and all his posterity exterminated [II Kings 10:7]. Indeed, Jehu rightly reports that “nothing of God’s words has fallen to the ground, but he has done what he said by the hand of his servant Elijah” [II Kings 10:10 p.]. And yet not without cause did he rebuke the citizens of Samaria because they had given assistance. “Are you righteous?” he asks; “if I conspired against my master, who killed all these?” [II Kings 10:9; IV Kings 10:9, Vg.] I have, unless I am mistaken, already clearly explained how in the same act as man’s evil deed shows itself, so God’s justice shines forth.

And for modest minds this answer of Augustine will always be enough: “Since the Father delivered up the Son, and Christ, his body, and Judas, his Lord, why in this delivering up is God just and man guilty, unless because in the one thing they have done, the cause of their doing it is not one?” But if some people find difficulty in what we are now saying-namely, that there is no agreement between God and man, where man does by God’s just impulsion what he ought not to do-let them recall what the same Augustine points out in another passage: “Who does not tremble at these judgments, where God works even in evil men’s hearts whatever he wills, yet renders to them according to their deserts?” And surely in Judas’ betrayal it will be no more right, because God himself both willed that his Son be delivered up and delivered him up to death, to ascribe the guilt of the crime to God than to transfer the credit for redemption to Judas. Therefore the same writer correctly points out, elsewhere, that in this examination God does not inquire into what men have been able to do, or what they have done, but what they have willed to do, so that purpose and will may be taken into account.

Let those for whom this seems harsh consider for a little while how bearable their squeamishness is in refusing a thing attested by clear Scriptural proofs because it exceeds their mental capacity, and find fault that things are put forth publicly, which if God had not judged useful for men to know, he would never have bidden his prophets and apostles to teach. For our wisdom ought to be nothing else than to embrace with humble teachableness, and at least without finding fault, whatever is taught in Sacred Scripture. Those who too insolently scoff, even though it is clear enough that they are prating against God, are not worthy of a longer refutation.